## SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Bluetooth ${ }^{\circledR}$ Pushbutton Transmitter Module

## BBluetooth C $\mathcal{F C}$, RoHs

Important: Read All Instructions Prior to Installation

## 1. General description

1.1 Basic functionality

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E are wireless push switches for lighting, building or industrial automation control systems using Bluetooth® low energy technology.

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is mechanically compatible with existing switch elements enabling quick integration into a wide range of designs. Key applications are wall-mounted or portable switches either with up to two rockers or up to four push buttons.

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E pushbutton transmitters are battery-powered. When the push button is pushed down or released, a radio telegram according to the Bluetooth® low energy standard is transmitted. This radio telegram transmits the status of all four push buttons when the push button was pushed down or released. SR-SBP2801 BLE-E radio telegrams are protected with AES-128 security based on a device-unique private key.

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is available in the following variants:
1.SR-SBP2801-BLE-E

Stand-alone module without additional components for OEM integration
2.SR-SBP2801K4-BLE-E

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E integrated into European-style single / double rocker wall switch housing
3.SR-SBP2801K4-BLE-E(US)

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E integrated into US-style single or double rocker pad housing
The term "SR-SBP2801-BLE-E" as used in this document applies to all product variants unless otherwise mentioned. Figure 1 below shows from left to right the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module, the European wall switches and the US-style rocker pads.


Figure 1 - Standalone Module, European Wall Switches and US-style rocker pads

### 1.2 Technical data

| Antenna | Integrated PCB antenna |
| :---: | :---: |
| Max. transmit power measured | $0.4 \mathrm{dBm} / 1.1 \mathrm{~mW}$ |
| Communication Range (guidance only) | 75 m ideal line of sight / 10 m indoor environment |
| Communication Standard | Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) |
| Radio Frequency (min / max) | $2402 \mathrm{MHz} / 2480 \mathrm{MHZ}$ |
| Radio Channels (default) | CH 37 / 38 / 39 (2402 MHz / 2426 MHz / 2480 MHZ ) |
| Data Rate and Modulation | 1 Mbit/s GFSK (default) / 2 Mbit GFSK (NFC option) |
| Configuration Interface | NFC Forum Type 2 Tag (ISO/IEC 14443 Part 2 and 3) |
| Device Identification | Unique 48 Bit Device ID (factory programmed) |
| Security | AES128 (CBC Mode) with Sequence Code |
| Power Supply | 3VDC (1*CR2430 Battery) |
| Button Inputs | Up to four buttons or two rockers |
| Dimensions | $40.0 \times 40.0 \times 11.2 \mathrm{~mm}$ |
| Weight | $20 \mathrm{~g}+/-1 \mathrm{~g}$ |

### 1.3 Environmental conditions

| Operating Temperature | $-25^{\circ} \mathrm{C} \ldots 65^{\circ} \mathrm{C}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Storage Temperature | $-25^{\circ} \mathrm{C} \ldots 65^{\circ} \mathrm{C}$ |
| Humidity | $0 \%$ to $95 \%$ r.h. (non-condensing) |

## 2. Functional information

### 2.1 Product overview

The pushbutton transmitter module SR-SBP2801-BLE-E from Sunricher enables the implementation of wireless remote controls. It transmits Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) data telegrams where the required energy is provided by battery.
The SR-SBP2801-BLE-E product outline with key functional components is shown in Figure 2 below


Button Contact
Snap-in and rotation axis for pushbuttons or switch rocker

Figure 2 - SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Product Outline

### 2.2 Basic functionality

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E devices contain 4 button contacts which are pushed by an appropriate push button, switch rocker or a similar construction mounted onto the device.

When the push button is pushed down, a BLE radio telegram is transmitted which identifies the action (pressed or not pressed) and the status of the four button contacts. Releasing the push button similarly transmits a different radio telegram.
is therefore possible to distinguish between radio telegrams sent when the button was pushed and radio telegrams sent when the button was released

By identifying these different telegrams types and measuring the time between pushing and releasing of the button, it is possible to distinguish between "Long" and "Short" button contact presses. This enables simple implementation of applications such as dimming control or blinds control including slat action.

## How to get the same functionality as EnOcean Switch and replace it

By factory default, this module can not work with those platforms which have integrated EnOcean switch, to enable this module to work with those platforms and get the same functionality as the EnOcean switch, please execute the following steps:

Remove the rocker(s) and the switch housing from the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module. Then, all four button contacts (A0, A1, B0 and B1) have to be pressed and held at the same time or over 10 seconds.

### 2.3 Functional block diagram



Figure 3 - Functional block diagram of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E

Processor
Determines the status of the button contacts, encodes this status into a data word, generates the proper radio felegram structure and sends it to the radio transmitter

RF transmitter
Transmits the data in the form of a series of short 2.4 GHz Bluetooth Low Energy radio telegrams using the integrated antenna

## NFC interface

Allows reading and writing certain product parameters using an NFC compliant reader writer supporting NFC Forum Type 2 tags (as specified by ISO/IEC 14443 Part 2 and 3)

### 2.4 User Interface

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E devices provide four button contacts. They are grouped into two channels
(Channel A and Channel B) each containing two button contacts (State O and State I).

The state of all four button contacts (pressed or not pressed) is transmitted together with a unique device identification (48 Bi device ID) whenever the energy bow is pushed or re-leased.

Figure 4 below shows the arrangement of the four button contacts and their designation:


Figure 4 - Button contact designation

## 3. Telegram transmission

### 3.1 Radio channel parameters

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E transmits Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) advertising telegrams within the 2.4 GHz radio frequency band ( 2402 MHz ... 2480MHz)
By default, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will use the three BLE advertising channels (BLE Channel 37, 38 and 39) defined for transmission. The transmission of a radio telegram on these three advertising channels is called an Advertising Event.

Use of different radio channels within the frequency band from 2402 MHz to 2480 MHz is possible, see chapter 6.7.10.

The initialization value for data whitening is set as follows:
1.For BLE channels is set according to specification (value = radio channel)
2. For the custom radio channels the initialization value is equal to the offset from 2400 MHZ (e.g. value $=3$ for 2403 MHz )
Table 1 below summarizes radio channels supported by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E

| Radio Channel | Frequency | Channel Type |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BLE Radio Channels |  |  |
| 37 | 2402 MHZ | BLE Advertising Channel |
| 0 | 2404 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 1 | 2406 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| ... |  |  |
| 10 | 2424 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 38 | 2426 MHZ | BLE Advertising Channel |
| 11 | 2428 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 12 | 2430 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| ... |  |  |
| 36 | 2478 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 39 | 2480 MHZ | BLE Advertising Channel |
| Custom Radio Channels |  |  |
| 40 | 2403 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |
| 41 | 2405 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |
| ... |  |  |
| 77 | 2477 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |
| 78 | 2479 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |

Table 1 -SR-SBP2801-BLE-E supported radio channels

## 2 Default radio transmission sequence

2801-BLE-E transmits telegrams in its standard configuration by using so-called Advertisin Events.

An advertising event is defined as the transmission of the same radio telegram on all selected radio channels (by default this would be on BLE Channel 37, 38 and 39) one after another with minimum delay in between
For reliability reasons, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will send several (minimum two, maximum three) advertising events for each button input. The resulting transmission sequence is shown in Figure 5 below.
the default interval between the advertising events is 20 ms . Starting with product version DC-06 it is possible to reduce this interval to 10 ms via the NFC configuration interface. See chapter 6.7.9 for details.

| CH 37 | CH 38 | CH 39 | INTERVAL <br> (20ms or 10 ms$)$ | CH 37 | CH 38 | CH 39 | INTERVAL <br> (20ms or 10 ms$)$ | CH 37 | CH 38 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CH 39 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Figure 5 - Default radio transmission sequence

### 3.3 User-defined radio transmission sequences

In certain situations, it might be desirable to transmit radio telegrams on channels other than the three advertising channels.

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E therefore allows to select the radio channels to be used for the transmission of data telegrams and commissioning telegrams. The following transmission modes are supported:
1.Both commissioning telegrams and data telegrams are transmitted on the advertising channels as three advertising events. This is the default configuration and described in chapter 3.2 above
2.Commissioning telegrams are transmitted on the advertising channels as three advertising events while data telegrams are transmitted in a user-defined sequence as described below.
3.Both commissioning and data telegrams are transmitted in a user-defined sequence as described below.

The selection of the transmission mode is done using the VARIANT register of the NFC configuration interface described in chapter 6.7.9.

### 3.3.1 Supported radio transmission sequences

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E supports the following user-defined sequences
1.Three channel sequence
This sequence is similar to the default Advertising Event with the difference that the user can select the radio channels to be used. The three-channel sequence is described in chapter 3.3.2 below.
2.Two channel sequence

In this sequence the radio telegram is transmitted using four transmissions on two radio channels. It is described in chapter 3.3.3 below.
3.One channel sequence

In this sequence the radio telegram is transmitted using six transmissions on one radio channel. It is described in chapter 3.3 .4 below.
The selection of user-defined radio transmission sequences is made via the VARIANT register of the NFC configuration interface, please see chapter 6.7.9

### 3.3.2 Three-channel radio transmission sequence

The three-channel radio transmission sequence is similar to the default transmission sequence. The difference is that the radio channels (BLE Channel 37, 38 and 39 in the default transmission sequence) can be selected using the registers TX_CHANNEL1, TX_CHANNEL2 and TX_CHANNEL3.

The SR-SBP2801-BLE-E telegram will in this mode be transmitted on the radio channel selected by TX_CHANNEL1 first, immediately followed by a transmission on the radio channel selected by TX_CHANNEL and a transmission on the radio channel selected by TX_CHANNEL3
This transmission sequence will be sent three times in total as shown in Figure 6 below.
The default interval between the advertising events is 20 ms . Starting with product version DC-06 it is possible to reduce this interval to 10 ms via the NFC configuration interface. See chapter 6.7.9 for details.


Figure 6 - Three channel radio transmission sequence
The format of TX_CHANNEL1, TX_CHANNEL2 and TX_CHANNEL3 is described in chapter 6.7.10

### 3.3.3 Two-channel radio transmission sequence

The two-channel radio transmission sequence removes transmission on the third radio channel (selected by TX CHANNEL3) and instead repeats the transmission once more (four times in total)

The SR-SBP2801-BLE-E telegram will in this mode be transmitted on the radio channel selected by TX_CHANNEL1 first, immediately followed by a transmission on the radio channel selected by TX_CHANNEL2.

This two-channel transmission sequence will be sent four times in total as shown in Figure 7 below
The default interval between the advertising events is 20 ms . Starting with product version DC-06 it is possible to reduce this interval to 10 ms via the NFC configuration interface. See chapter 6.7.9 for details.

| TX_CHANNEL1 | TX_CHANNEL2 | INTERVAL (20ms or 10 ms ) | TX_CHANNEL1 | TX_CHANNEL2 | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { INTERVAL } \\ (20 \mathrm{~ms} \text { or } 10 \mathrm{~ms}) \end{array}$ | TX_CHANNEL1 | T_CHAANEL2 | interval (20ms or 10ms) | CHANN | TX_CHANNEL2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## Figure 7 - Two channel radio transmission sequence

### 3.3.4 Single-channel radio transmission sequence

The single-channel radio transmission sequence removes transmission on the second and third radio channel selected by TX_CHANNEL2 and TX_CHANNEL3 respectively), i.e. all transmissions will be on the radio channel selected by TX_CHANNEL1.

The SR-SBP2801-BLE-E telegram will be sent six times on this radio channel as shown in Figure 8 below.
The default interval between the advertising events is 20 ms . Starting with product version DC-06 it is possible to reduce this interval to 10 ms via the NFC configuration interface. See chapter 6.7.9 for details.


## Figure 8 - Single channel radio transmission sequence

The format of TX_CHANNEL1 is described in chapter 6.7.10.

## 4. Telegram format

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E transmits Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) radio telegrams in the 2.4 GHz band. For detailed information about the Bluetooth Low Energy standard, please refer to the applicable specifications.

Figure 9 below summarizes the BLE frame structure

| Preamble <br> $0 \times A A$ | Access Address <br> $0 \times 8 E 899 B E D 6$ | Header <br> (2 Byte) | Source Address <br> ( 6 Byte) | Payload <br> $(0 \ldots 31$ Byte) | Check Sum <br> (3 Byte) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## Figure 9 - BLE frame structure

The content of these fields is described in more detail below.

### 4.1 Preamble

The BLE Preamble is 1 byte long and identifies the start of the BLE frame. The value of the BLE Preamble is always set to 0xAA.

### 4.2 Access Address

The 4 byte BLE Access Address identifies the radio telegram type. For advertising frames, the value of the Access Address is always set to $0 \times 8$ E89BED6.

### 4.3 Header

header.
Bit 15 (MSb)

| UNUSED <br> $(2$ Bit $)$ | LENGTH <br> $(6$ Bit $)$ | RXADDR <br> $(1$ Bit $)$ | TXADDR <br> $(1$ Bit $)$ | UNUSED <br> $(2$ Bit $)$ | TYPE <br> $(4$ Bit $)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Length of
0: Not used 1: Random

## Figure 10 - BLE header structure

### 4.4 Source address

The 6 byte BLE Source Address (MAC address) uniquely identifies each SR-SBP2801-BLE-E product. SR-SBP2801-BLE-E supports two source address modes:
. Static Source Address mode (default)
In this mode, the source address is constant (but its lower 32 bit can be configured via NFC interface)
2. Resolvable Private Address mode (NFC configurable option)
this mode, the source address changes for each transmission
By default, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses Static Source Address mode. Private Resolvable Address mode can be selected by setting the Private Source Address flag in the Configuration register (see chapter 6.7.3) to 0b1.

These two address modes are described in the following chapters.

### 4.4.1 Static source address mode

By default, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses static source addresses meaning that the source address is constant during normal operation. The static source address can be read and configured (written) via NFC as described in chapter 6 .

The structure of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E static addresses is as follows:
1.The upper 2 bytes of the source address are used to identify the device type and set to $0 x E 215$ for all SR-SBP2801-BLE-E devices (to designate Sunricher SBP 2801 device type). These two bytes cannot be changed.
2. The lower 4 bytes are uniquely assigned to each device. They can be changed using the NFC configuration interface as described in chapter 6.7.4
Figure 11 below illustrates the static address structure used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E.

| Product Type ID (16 Bit) | $\quad$ Unique Device Address (32 Bit) |
| :---: | :---: |
| OxE215 |  |

## MSB

## Figure 11 - BLE static source address structure

### 4.4 Resolvable private address mod

For some applications it is desirable to obfuscate the origins of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E data telegrams in order to For some applications it is desirable to obfuscate the origins of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E data telegrams in order to as defined in the Bluetooth Core Specification.

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can be configured to use resolvable private addresses by setting the RPAADDRESS MODE flag within the Configuration register (described in chapter 6.7.3) to 0b1

When using resolvable private addresses, the address used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is modified (rotated) according to a defined scheme which on one hand precludes determining the device identity by unauthorized receivers while allowing authorized receivers (sharing a specific security key with SR-SBP2801-BLE-E) to do so.
The shared security key - which has to be known by both SR-SBP2801-BLE-E and the authorized receiver - is called the Identity Resolution Key (IRK). SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses its device-unique random key as identity esolution key. This key can be modified if needed via the NFC configuration interface as described in chapter 6.7.5.

For each data telegram transmitted by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E (i.e. for every button push or release), a new
resolvable private address is generated. The 48 bit address field of such resolvable private address is split into two sub-fields:

## 1.prand

This field contains a random number which always starts (two most significant bits) with 0b10. The prand value is changed for each telegram that is transmitted. Individual advertising events used to transmit one telegram
(as described in chapter 3) use the same prand value.
2 hash
This field contains a verification value (hash) generated from prand using the IRK The structure of a resolvable private address is shown in Figure 12 below.

| prand (24 Bit) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 1 | Random Data (22 Bit) | hash (24 Bit) |

Figure 12 - BLE resolvable private address structure
The prand value is encrypted using the IRK. The lowest 24 bit of the result (encrypted val- ue) are then used as hash. The concatenation of 24 bit prand and 24 bit hash will be transmitted as 48 bit private resolvable source address.

The receiver maintains a list of IRK for all transmitters that have been commissioned to work with it.
Whenever the receiver receives a data telegram with a resolvable private address (identified by the most significant bits of the address field being set to 0b10), it will itself generate a 24 bit hash from the 24 bit prand sequentially using each IRK known to it (i.e. the IRK of each device that has been learned into it).

If an IRK matches (i.e. when prand is encoded with the IRK then the result matches hash), then the receiver has established the IRK used by the transmitter and thereby the identity of the transmitter
So conceptually the IRK takes the role of the device address of the transmitter while prand and hash provide a mechanism for the receiver to select the correct IRK among the set of IRK known to it.

This mechanism is illustrated in Figure 13 below.


## Figure 13 - Resolving private addresses

Refer to Appendix B for an example of resolving a resolvable private address
Note that commissioning telegrams (as described in chapter 5.3.2) always use static source addresses (as described in chapter 4.4.1) since they establish the device identity and contain the IRK in the payload.

### 4.5 Check Sum

The 3 byte BLE Check Sum is used to verify data integrity of received BLE radio telegrams. It is calculated as CRC (cyclic redundancy check) of the BLE Header, Source Address and Payload fields

### 4.6 Telegram payload

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can transmit two types of telegrams
1.Data telegrams

The payload of data telegrams contains the switch status together with optional data
(if applicable), the current sequence counter value and the resulting authentication signature
.Commissioning telegrams
ere curity key as well as the current value of the sequence counter and the device address
The payload structure of both telegram types is described in the following chapters

### 4.6.1 Data telegram payload

The payload of data telegrams is $13 \ldots 17$ bytes long (depending on the size of the Optional Data field) and consists of the following fields:

The Length field specifies the combined length of the following fields. The content of the field depends on the size of the Optional Data field (which can be $0 / 1 / 2$ or 4 byte). The resulting Length setting would be $12 / 13 /$ 14 or 16 byte ( $0 \times 0 \mathrm{C} / 0 \times 0 \mathrm{D} /$
$0 \times 0 \mathrm{E} / 0 \times 10$ ) respectively
2. Type (1 byte)

The Type field identifies the data type used for this telegram. For SR-SBP2801-BLE-E data telegrams, this field is always set to 0xFF to designate manufacturer-specific data field
.Manufacturer ID (2 byte)
he Manufacturer ID field is used to identify the manufacturer of BLE devices based on assigned numbers unricher has been assigned 0x0A78 as manufacturer ID code.
he Manufacturer ID can be changed via the NFC configuration interface as described in chapter 6.7.7
4.Sequence Counter (4 byte) at the time of production and incremented for each telegram (data telegram or commissioning telegram) sent.
5. Switch Status (1 byte)

The Switch Status field reports the button action. The encoding of this field is described in chapter 4.6.2.
. Optional Data (0 / 1 / 2 or 4 byte)
SR-SBP2801-BLE-E provides the option to transmit additional user-defined data within each data telegram as described in chapter 6.7.8
7. Security Signature (4 byte)

The Security Signature is used to authenticate SR-SBP2801-BLE-E radio telegrams as described in chapte 4.6.3

Figure 14 below illustrates the data telegram payload

| $\begin{gathered} 0 \times 0 \mathrm{C} \\ \ldots \times 10 \end{gathered}$ | 0xFF | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Manufacturer ID } \\ & 0 \times 0 \mathrm{~A} 78 \end{aligned}$ | Sequence Counter <br> (4 Byte) | Switch Status | Optional Data <br> (0/1/2/4 Byte) | Security Signature (4 Byte) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

LEN TYPE

## Figure 14 - Data telegram payload structure

### 4.6.2 Button action encoding

The Switch Status field within the data telegram payload identifies the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E button action (button push or release). SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses the following sequence to identify and transmit button contact status:

1. Determine direction of the button movement (Push Action or Release Action)
2. Read input status of all button contacts
3. Calculate data payload
4. Calculate security signature

In SR-SBP2801-BLE-E, the type of action (Press Action or Release Action) is indicated by Bit 0 (button). If a button contact has been actuated during Press Action or Release Action, then this is indicated by the according status bit set to ' 1 '.

Note that all contacts that were pressed during Press Action will be released during Release Action. The case of continuing to hold one (or several) button contacts during Release Action is mechanically not possible.

The button action encoding used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is shown Figure 15 in below.

| Switch Status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Reserved |  |  | B1 | B0 | A1 | A0 | ACTION TYPE |
| Bit 7 | Bit 6 | Bit 5 | Bit 4 | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Bit 1 | Bit 0 |
|  | Shall be 0b000 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0=\text { No Action } \\ & 1=\text { Action } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0=\text { No Action } \\ & 1=\text { Action } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0=\mathrm{No} \text { Action } \\ & 1=\text { Action } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0=\text { No Action } \\ & 1=\text { Action } \end{aligned}$ | $0=$ Release Action <br> $1=$ Press Action |

## Figure $\mathbf{1 5}$-SR-SBP2801-BLE-E button action encoding

### 4.6.3 Commissioning telegram payload

The payload of commissioning telegrams is 30 bytes long and consists of the following fields:
1.Length (1 byte)

The Length field specifies the combined length of the following fields. For SR-SBP2801-BLE-E commissioning telegrams, this field is set to 0x1D to indicate 29 byte of manufacturer-specific data. Note: In product versions prior to DC-06 this field was incorrectly set to $0 \times 1 \mathrm{E}$.
2. Type (1 byte)

The Type field identifies the data type used for this telegram. This field is set to 0xFF
to indicate a "Manufacturer-specific Data" field
3.Manufacturer ID (2 byte)

The Manufacturer ID field is used to identify the manufacturer of BLE devices based on assigned numbers. By default, this field is set to 0x0A78 (Sunricher). This field can be changed via the NFC configuration interface as described in chapter
6.7.7.
4. Sequence Counter (4 byte)

The Sequence Counter is a continuously incrementing counter used for security processing. It is initialized to 0 at the time of production and incremented for each telegram (data telegram or commissioning telegram) sent
5.Security Key (16 byte)

Each SR-SBP2801-BLE-E device contains its own 16 byte device-unique random security key which is generated and programmed during manufacturing. It is transmitted during commissioning to enable the receiver to authenticate SR-SBP2801-BLE-E data telegrams and used as IRK for the case of resolvable private address mode
6.Static Source Address (6 byte)

The Static Source Address is used to uniquely identify each BLE device. It is transmitted as part of the BLE frame as described in chapter 4.4.1
Some devices (most notable all iOS-based products) however do not expose this address to their applications. This makes it impossible to use such applications to
commission SR-SBP2801-BLE-E. The Static Source Address is therefore again transmitted as part of the payload.

Figure 16 below illustrates the commissioning telegram payload

| LEN | TYP | Manufacturer ID | Manufacturer-specific Data |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0x1D | 0xFF | 0x0A78 | Sequence Counter (4 Byte) | Security Key (16 Byte) |  | Static Source Address (6 Byte)

Figure 16 - Commissioning telegram payload structure
4.7 SR-SBP2801-BLE-E data telegram authentication

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E implements telegram authentication for transmitted data telegrams to ensure that only telegrams from transmitters using a previously exchanged security key will be accepted by the receiver. Authentication relies on a 32 bit telegram signature which is calculated as shown in Figure 17 below and exchanged as part of the radio telegram.


Figure 17 - Telegram authentication flow

Sequence counter, source address and the remaining telegram data together form the in- put data for the signature algorithm. This algorithm uses AES128 encryption based on the device-unique random security key to generate a 32 bit signature which will be transmitted as part of the radio telegram.

The signature is therefore dependent both on the current value of the sequence counter, the device source address and the telegram payload. Changing any of these three parameters will therefore result in a different signature.
The receiver performs the same signature calculation based on sequence counter, source address and the emaining telegram data of the received telegram using the security key it received from SR-SBP2801-BLE-E remaining telegram data
during commissioning.

The receiver then compares the signature reported as part of the telegram with the signature it has calculated f these two signatures match, then the following statements are true:
1.Transmitter (SR-SBP2801-BLE-E) and receiver use the same security key
2.The message content (address, sequence counter, data) has not been modified

At this point, the receiver has validated that the message originates from a trusted transmitter (as identified by its security key) and that its content is valid
n order to avoid message replay (capture and retransmission of a valid message), it is required that the receiver tracks the value of the sequence counter used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E and only accepts messages with higher sequence counter values (i.e. not accepts equal or lower sequence counter values for subsequent telegrams).

### 4.7.1 Authentication implementation

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E implements data telegram authentication based on AES128 in CCM (Counter with CBCMAC) mode as described in IETF RFC3610. At the time of writing, the RFC3610 standard could be found here: https://www.ietf.org/ffc/ffc3610.txt

The 13 Byte CCM Nonce (number used once - unique) initialization value is constructed as concatenation of 6 byte Source Address, 4 byte Sequence Counter and 3 bytes of value
$0 \times 00$ (for padding).
Note that both Source Address and Sequence Counter use little endian format (least significant byte first)
Figure 18 below shows the structure of the AES128 Nonce.

| AES128 Nonce (13 Byte) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Source Address |  |  |  |  |  | Sequence Counter |  |  |  | Padding |  |  |
| Byte 0 | Byte 1 | Byte 2 | Byte 3 | Byte 4 | Byte 5 | Byte 0 | Byte 1 | Byte 2 | Byte 3 | 0x00 | 0x00 | 0x00 |

## Figure 18 - AES128 Nonce structure

The AES128 Nonce and the 128 bit device-unique security key are then used to calculate a 32 bit signature of the authenticated telegram payload shown in Figure 19 below.

| Authenticated Payload |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LEN | TYPE | MANUFACTURER | Sequence Counter |  |  | STATE | Optional Data |  |
| Byte 0 | $0 \times F F$ | $0 \times 03 D A$ | Byte 0 | Byte 1 | Byte 2 | Byte 3 | Byte 0 | $0 / 1 / 2 / 4$ byte |

## Figure 19 - Authenticated payload

The calculated 32 bit signature is then appended to the data telegram payload as shown in Figure 14 in chapter 4.6.

In addition to the RFC3610 standard itself, please consult also Appendix C for a step by step description of the authentication process.

## 5. Commissioning

Commissioning is the process by which SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is learned into a receiver (actuator, controller, gateway, etc.).
The following two tasks are required in this process
1.Device identification
The receiver needs to know how to uniquely identify this specific SR-SBP2801-BLE-E device. This is achieved
by using a unique 48 Bit ID (Source Address) for each SR-SBP2801-BLE-E device as described in chapter 4.4. In addition, up to 4 byte of Optional Data can be configured as described in chapter 6.7.8
2.Security parameter exchange

The receiver needs to be able to authenticate radio telegrams from SR-SBP2801-BLE-E in order to ensure that they originate from this specific device and have not been modified as described in chapter 4.6.3. This is achieved by exchanging a 128 Bit random security key used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E to authenticate its radio telegrams.

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E provides the following options for these tasks:
1.NFC-based commissioning

The SR-SBP2801-BLE-E parameters are read by a suitable commissioning tool (e.g. NFC smartphone with suitable software) which is already part of the network into which
SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will be commissioned. The commissioning tool then communicates these parameters to the intended receiver of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E radio telegrams. NFC-based commissioning is described in
chapter 6
2.Camera-based commissioning

Each SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module contains an optically readable QR Code which identifies its
and its security key. This QR code can be read by a by a suitable commissioning tool (e.g. smart phone) then tommunich SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will be commissioned. The commissioning The QR code structure is described in chapter 7.2
3.Radio-based commissioning

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can communicate its parameters via special radio telegrams (commission- ing telegrams) to the intended receiver. To do so, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can be temporarily placed into radio-based commissioning mode as described in chapter 5.3

### 5.1 NFC-based commissioning

All required SR-SBP2801-BLE-E parameters can be read via a suitable NFC reader and writer sup- porting the ISO/IEC 14443 Part 2 and 3 standards. The actual NFC implementation in SBP 2801 uses a Mifare Ultralight tag.

Commissioning via NFC should follow these steps:

1. Unlock SR-SBP2801-BLE-E using the default NFC PIN code 0x0000E215
2. Read the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Source Address, Security Key and Sequence Counter and configure the receiver accordingly
3. Important: The pre-programmed random security key used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can be obtained both from the product DMC code as described in chapter 5.2, from received commissioning telegrams as described in chapter 5.3 and via the NFC interface.
For security-critical applications where unauthorized users could have physical access to the switch it is therefore strongly recommended to change the security key to a new security key as part of the NFC-based commissioning process. To do so, follow the procedure outlined in chapter 6.7.5.
For additional security, NFC read-out of the new security key can be disabled by setting the PRIVATE SECURITY KEY flag in the Configuration register before setting the new security key
This ensures that even persons knowing the correct PIN code to configure this specific switch cannot read out the programmed new security key. Please verify that you have properly documented the new security key as there is no possibility to retrieve this after it has been written
4. Important: It is strongly recommended to disable radio-based commissioning after programming a new security key. This ensures that the new security key cannot be read out by triggering a commissioning telegram as described in chapter 5.3.
解 0b1, see chapter 6.7.3.
5. Important: You should always change the NFC PIN code from its default setting to a new NFC PIN code and lock the NFC configuration interface. This step is mandatory to avoid access to the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E configuration using the default PIN code.
then SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can be reset to factory mode
(with the defau
5.4. For security reasons, this factory reset will always reset the security key to its pre-programmed value
5.2 Camera-based commissioning
ach SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module contains an optically readable Commissioning Code implemented either as Data Matrix Code or as QR Code depending on the device revision.
his Commissioning Code on the device label can be scanned by a suitable commissioning tool (e.g. smart phone or PC with DMC / QR code reader) to read the static source address and the security key of the device.

The commissioning tool can the use this information to configure the intended receiver of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E radio telegrams.
See chapter 7 for details of the commissioning code structure

### 5.3 Radio-based commissioning

or cases where both NFC and camera-based commissioning are not feasible it is possible to set SR SBP2801-BLE-E into a specific mode where it transmits commissioning telegrams
his functionality can be disabled via the NFC configuration interface by setting the DISABLE LRN TELEGRAM flag in the Configuration register to 0b1 (see chapter 6.7.3).

Starting from product version DC-06, this functionality can also be disabled by means of a specific button press (long press of A0 + A1 + B1), see chapter 5.3.4.

### 5.3.1 Commissioning mode entry

Commissioning mode is entered using a special button contact sequence. This is illustrated in Figure 20 below.


Figure 20 - Button sequence to enter radio-based commissioning mode

To enter commissioning mode, start by selecting one button contact of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E. Any button of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E (A0, A1, B0, B1) can be used. This button is referred to as Button X in Figure 20 above. Next, execute the following long-short-long sequence:

1. Press and hold the selected button for more than 7 seconds before releasing it
2. Press the selected button quickly (hold for less than 2 seconds)
3. Press and hold the selected button again for more than 7 seconds before releasing it

Upon detection of this sequence, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will enter commissioning mode if the DISABLE LRN TELEGRAM flag in the Configuration register of the NFC interface is not set (ObO, default state)

NFC interface is set ( 0 b1, configured via NFC interface) then SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will not enter commissioning mode and transmit normal data telegrams according to the button status.
5.3.2 Commissioning telegram transmission

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will transmit a commissioning telegram (on the radio channels selected as described in chapter 3.1) upon entering commissioning mode. The structure of the commissioning telegram is described in hapter 4.6.3
SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will continue to transmit commissioning telegrams whenever the button used for entry into commissioning mode (Button_X) is pressed or released again.
5.3.3 Exit from commissioning mode

Pressing any key except the button used for entry into commissioning mode (Button_X) will cause SR-SBP2801-BLE-E to stop transmitting commissioning telegrams and return to normal data telegram ransmission.

### 5.3.4 Disable commissioning mode

Starting with product version DC-06 it will be possible to disable commissioning mode in addition to using the Cinterface also by means of a specific button input.
To do so, press button contacts A0, A1 and B1 and hold them for at least 10 seconds before releasing them.
Commissioning mode can be re-enabled by means of a factory reset as described below.

### 5.4 Factory reset

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can be reset to its default settings by means of a factory reset
This ensures that SR-SBP2801-BLE-E can be reset to a known configuration in case the PIN for the NFC access has been lost or NFC access is not possible for other reasons
in order to execute such factory reset, the rocker(s) and switch housing have to be removed from the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module. Then, two diagonal button contacts (for instance A0 and B1 or A1 and B0) have to be pressed and held at the same time for over 10 seconds.

Upon detecting this input, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will restore the default settings of the following items:
1.Static Source Address
2. Security Key and Security Key Write register

Both registers will be restored to the value of the factory-programmed security key
3.Manufacturer ID

The manufacturer ID will be reset to $0 \times 0$ A78 (Sunricher)
4.NFC PIN Code

The NFC PIN Code will be reset to 0x0000E215
After such factory reset, Source Address and Security Key will again match the content of the DMC code on the unit label as described in chapter 7 .
In addition, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will reset the following registers:
1.Configuration register (to 0x00)
.Variant Register (to 0x00)

## 6. NFC interface

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E implements NFC Forum Type 2 Tag functionality as specified in the ISO/IEC 14443 Part 2 and 3 standards using an NXP NT3H2111 Mifare Ultralight tag
This NFC functionality can be used to access (read and write) the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E configuration memory and thereby configure the device as described in the following chapters.
. 6.1 below gives an introduction to the NFC functionality and options to use the NFC interface. For in-depth support for integrating the NXP NT3H2111 NFC functionality into PC or smartphone SW please contact NXP technical support.

### 6.1 Using the NFC interface

Using the NFC interface requires the following
1.NFC reader (either PC USB accessory or suitable smart phone / tablet)
2.NFC SW with read, write, PIN lock, PIN unlock and PIN change functionality

Sunricher recommends TWN4 (order code T4BT-FB2BEL2-SIMPL) from Elatec RFID Systems (https://www.elatec-rfid.com/en/) as USB NFC reader. This reader is shown in Figure 21 below.

Figure 21 - Elatec TWN4 MultiTech Desktop NFC Reade

WN4 can be configured as CDC / Virtual COM port and can then be accessed like any serial interface. It provides all necessary commands for the NFC interface, specifically to:
1.Read data from configuration memory and write data to configuration memory
2.Authenticate the user (to allow read / write of protected memory) via 32 bit PIN

NFC functionality is also available in certain Android smart phones and tablets. NXP provides a SW framework that can be used with Android devices and can advise regarding suitable tablets and smart phones.

NFC communication distance is for security reasons set to require direct contact between reader and switches based on SR-SBP2801-BLE-E

### 6.2 NFC interface functions

For a detailed description about the NFC functionality, please refer to the ISO/IEC 14443 standard.
For specific implementation aspects related to the NXP implementation in NT3H2111
lease refer to the NXP documentation which at the time of writing was available under this link https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/data-sheet/NT3H2111_2211.pdf

The following chapters summarize the different functions for reference purposes.

### 6.2.1 NFC interface state machine

Figure 22 below shows the overall state machine of the NFC interface.


### 6.2.2 IDLE state

IDLE is the waiting state after a Power-On Reset (POR), i.e. after the NFC tag has been introduced into the magnetic field of the NFC reader.

The NFC tag exits the IDLE state towards the READY 1 state when either a REQA or a WUPA command is received from the NFC reader. REQA and WUPA commands are transmitted by the NFC reader to determine whether any cards are present within its working range
Any other data received by the NFC tag while in IDLE state is discarded and the NFC tag will remain in IDLE state

### 6.2.3 READY 1 state

READY 1 is the first UID resolving state where the NFC tag resolves the first 3 bytes of the byte UID using the ANTICOLLISION or SELECT commands for cascade level

READY 1 state is exited after the SELECT command from cascade level 1 with the matching complete first par of the UID has been executed. The NFC tag then proceeds into READY 2 state where the second part of the UID is resolved.

### 6.2.4 READY 2 state

READY 2 is the second UID resolving state where the NFC tag resolves the remaining 4 bytes of the 7 byte UID using the ANTICOLLISION or SELECT commands for cascade level 2

READY 2 state is exited after the SELECT command from cascade level 2 with the matching complete part of the UID has been executed. The NFC tag then proceeds into ACTIVE state where the application-related commands can be executed

### 6.2.5 ACTIVE state

ACTIVE state enables read and write accesses to unprotected memory.
If access to protected memory is required, then the tag can transition from the ACTIVE state to AUTHENTICATED state by executing the PWD_AUTH command in conjunction with the correct 32 bit password.

### 6.2.6 Read command

The READ command requires a start pag address, and returns the 16 bytes of four fize) pages (where each page is 4 byte in size).

For example, if the specified address is 03 h then pages $03 \mathrm{~h}, 04 \mathrm{~h}, 05 \mathrm{~h}, 06 \mathrm{~h}$ are returned Spe- cial conditions apply if the READ ar the end of the memory are

Figure 23 below shows the read command sequence.

### 6.2.7 Write command

The WRITE command requires a start page address and returns writes 4 bytes of data into that page.

Figure 24 below shows the read command sequence.


Figure 23 - NFC read command sequence


Figure 24 - NFC write command sequence

### 6.2.8 Password authentication

(PWD_AUTH) command
The protected memory area can be accessed only after successful passw
the PWD_AUTH command.

The PWD_AUTH command takes the
password as parameter and, if successful, turns the password authentication acknowledge, PACK.
igure 25 below shows the passwor authentication sequence.


Figure 25 - Password authentication sequence

After successful authentication, the password can be changed by writing the new password to memory page 0xE5
Note that a read access to page $0 \times E 5$ always return $0 \times 00000000$, i.e. it is not possible to read out the curren PIN code.
6.3 Using TWN4 as USB NFC reader

Fatec RFID Systems provides a PC software called "Director" as part of their software sup- port package. At he time of writing, this was available from this address: https://www.elatec-rfid.com/en/download-center/contact-form-twn4-devpack-sdk/

Figure 26 below shows the user interface of this software.


## Figure 26 - User interface of TWN4 Director

By using this software, it is easily possible to generate the required serial commands that have to be sent via CDC / Virtual COM port to TWN4 and understand the structure of the response that will be received back.

### 6.3.1 Useful commands

The following commands are especially useful:

Used to search for a connected tag and identify type and ID of such tag. This should always be used as first peration ahead of any read / write / authenticate actions. Example: SearchTag(32)
2.NTAG PwdAuth(32 bit password as hex bytes, 16 bit password ack as hex bytes)

Used to authenticate access to the protected memory area
Example: NTAG_PwdAuth(0x00 0x00 0xE2 0x15, 0x00 0x00)
3.NTAG_Read(page)

Used to read one page of data
Example: NTAG_Read(0x04)
4.NTAG_Write(page, data)

Used to write one page of data
Example: NTAG Write( $0 \times 40,0 \times 120 \times 340 \times 560 \times 78$ )
5.NTAG_Write(0xE5, PIN Code)

Used to set a new pin code by writing to page 0xE5
Example: NTAG_Write(0xE5, 0x12 0x34 0x56 0x78)

### 6.3.2 Translation into binary data

In order to use these commands within a user application, they have to be translated into raw data. This can be done by enabling the "Show Raw Data" feature in the command log of the Director software as shown in Figure 27 below.

NTAG_PwdAuth ( $0 \times 00$ 0x00 0xE2 0x15, 0x00 0x00)| Result: true | Request: 20060000E2150000 | Response: 0001

## $\square$ Show Raw Data

## Figure 27 - Enabling raw data display

This raw data can then be transmitted to TWN4 via a virtual COM port. TWN4 will respond to the request with the corresponding response as shown in Figure 28 below.

M COM12:9600baud - Tera Term VT
Datei Bearbeiten Einstellungen Steuerung Fenster Hilfe

## 20060000E2150000

0001

Figure 28 - Binary data exchange

### 6.4 Configuration memory organization

The SR-SBP2801-BLE-E configuration memory is divided into the following areas.

1. Public data
2.Protected data

In addition to that, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E maintains a private configuration memory region used to store default parameters and confidential information which is not accessible to the user.
Figure 29 below shows the configuration memory structure used by SR-SBP2801-BLEE.


### 6.5 NFC memory address map

The NFC-accessible configuration memory is organized in memory pages where each memory page is 4 byte wide. An NFC access reads 16 bytes ( 4 pages) or writes 4 bytes (one page). The addresses map of the configuration memory is shown in Table 2 below. The byte order is little endian, i.e. byte 0 will be read first and byte 3 last.

| Area | NFC Page | Byte Offset | Byte 0 (LSB) | Byte 1 | Byte 2 | Byte 3 (MSB) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public Memory Area |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Public | 0 (0x00) | 0 | Reserved |  |  |  |
| Public | ... | ... |  |  |  |  |
| Public | 3 (0x03) | 12 |  |  |  |  |
| Public | 4 (0x04) | 16 | Product Name "SBP2801" |  |  |  |
| Public | 5 (0x05) | 20 |  |  |  |  |
| Public | 6 (0x06) | 24 | Product ID Public |  |  |  |
| Public | 7 (0x07) | 28 |  |  |  |  |
| Public | 8 (0x08) | 32 | NFC Revision |  | Manufacturer ID |  |
| Public | 9 (0x09) | 36 | Reserved |  |  |  |
| Public | 10 (0x0A) | 40 | Hardware Revision |  |  |  |
| Public | 11 (0x0B) | 44 | Software Revision |  |  |  |
| Public | 12 (0x0C) | 48 | Static Source Address |  |  |  |
| Public | 13 (0x0D) | 52 | Sequence Counter |  |  |  |
| Protected Memory Area |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 14 (0x0E) | 56 | Configuration | Variant | Reserved |  |
| Protected | 15 (0x0F) | 60 | Opt Data 0 | Opt Data 1 | Opt Data 2 | Opt Data 3 |
| Protected | 16 (0x10) | 64 | Product ID Write |  |  |  |
| Protected | 17 (0x11) | 68 |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 18 (0x12) | 72 | Source ID Write |  |  |  |
| Protected | 19 (0x13) | 76 | Manufacturer ID Write |  | Reserved |  |
| Protected | 20 (0x14) | 80 | Security Key Write |  |  |  |
| Protected | ... | ... |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 23 (0x17) | 92 |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 24 (0x18) | 96 | TX_CHANNEL1 | TX_CHANNEL2 | TX_CHANNEL3 | Reserved |
| Protected | 25 (0x19) | 100 | Reserved |  |  |  |
| Protected | ... | ... |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 31 (0x1F) | 124 |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 32 (0x20) | 128 | Customer NFC Data |  |  |  |
| Protected | ... | ... |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 95 (0x5F) | 380 |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 96 (0x60) | 384 | Reserved |  |  |  |
| Protected | ... | ... |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 225 (0x10) | 900 |  |  |  |  |
| Protected | 229 (0xE5) | 916 | PIN Code (Write Only) |  |  |  |

## Table 2 - Configuration memory address map

### 6.6 Public data

Public data can be read by any NFC-capable device supporting the ISO/IEC 14443 Part 2 and 3 standards. No
specific security measures are used to restrict read access to this data.
The following items are located in the public data area:
1.SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Product Name

This is always "SBP2801"
2.SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Product ID

This is an 8 byte field which is by default set to $0 \times 0000000000000000$
Product ID and Manufacturer ID can be configured by the customer as required to identify his SR-SBP2801. BLE-E based product, see chapter 6.7.7
3.SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Manufacturer ID

This is an 2 byte field used to identify the manufacturer of a BLE product, see chap- ter 4.6. This field is by default set to $0 \times 0$ A78(Sunricher).
Product ID and Manufacturer ID can be configured by the customer as required to identify his SR-SBP2801-BLE-E based product, see chapter 6.7.7
4.SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Static Source Address

This is a 4 byte field containing the four least significant bytes (the two most significant bytes are always 0xE215) of the static source address used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E, see chapter 4.4.1. Each SR-SBP2801 BLE-E is pre-programmed with an individual static source address,
The Static Source Address can be configured by the customer as required to identify his SR-SBP2801-BLE-E based product, see chapter 6.7.4
5.Hardware Revision, Software Revision and NFC Revision

These fields identify the device revision

## 6. Telegram sequence counter

This is a 4 byte field which is initialized to zero during manufacturing and incremented for each transmitted telegram. Receivers shall never accept telegrams containing sequence counter values equal or less than previously received values to avoid replay attacks.

Changing the Static Source Address, Manufacturer ID and Product ID fields is only possible via protected data access as described below to prevent unauthorized modification.

For security reasons, the telegram sequence counter cannot be written or reset by any mechanism.

### 6.7 Protected data

The following items are located in the protected data area:

1. Source Address Write register

This 4 byte register is used to update the lower 4 byte of the Static Source Address, see chapter 6.7. 4
2.Product ID Write register

This 8 byte register is used to update the Product ID, see chapter 6.7.7
3.Manufacturer ID Write register

This 4 byte register is used to update the Manufacturer ID, see chapter 6.7.7
4. Security Key Write register

This 16 byte register is used to update the security key used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E, see chapter 6.7.5
5. Optional Data register

This 4 byte register contains optional data that can be transmitted as part of all data telegrams, see chapter 4.6. Optional Data 0 is sent first, Optional Data 3 last.
6.Configuration register

This 1 byte register is used to configure the functional behavior of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E, see chapter 6.7.3
7.Variant register

This 1 byte register is used to configure the transmission behavior of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E, see chapter 6.7.9
8.Custom Radio Channel registers (TX_CHANNEL1, TX_CHANNEL2 and TX_CHANNEL3)

These 1 byte registers are used to configure the radio channels in custom transmis- sion mode of SR
SBP2801-BLE-E, see chapter 6.7.10

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E reserves 64 byte for customer-specific NFC data, see chapter 6.7.11

### 6.7.1 PIN code

Protected data access is only possible after unlocking the configuration memory with the correct 32 bit PIN code. By default, the protected area is locked and the default pin code for unlocking access is 0x0000E215.

The default pin code shall be changed to a user-defined value as part of the installation process. This can be done by unlocking the NFC interface with the old PIN code and then writing the new PIN code to page 0xE5 as described in chapter 6.3.1

### 6.7.2 Configuration of product parameters

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E allows no direct modification of the following parameters:
1.Static Source Address
2.Product ID
3.Manufacturer ID
4. Security Key

In order to modify these parameters, the user has to write the new value into specific registers (Source Address Write, Product ID Write, Manufacturer ID Write and Security Key Write) in the protected data area and set the according Update flag in the Configuration register.

After that, the user has to push and release the button of the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module

### 6.7.3 Configuration register

The Configuration register is 1 byte wide and contains configuration flags. Figure 30 below shows the structure f the Configuration register.

| CONFIGURATION |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bit 7 | Bit 6 | Bit 5 | Bit 4 | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Bit 1 | Bit 0 |
| OPTIONAL D ATA S IZE | DISAB LE LRN <br> TELEGRAM | RPA ADDRESS <br> MODE | PRIVATE <br> SECUR ITY KEY | UPD ATE <br> SECUR ITY KEY | UPD ATE <br> MAN ID | UPD ATE <br> SOURCE ID |  |

## Figure 30 - Configuration register structure

he Configuration register is used to select the length of optional data, to disable the transmission of ommissioning telegrams, to select resolvable private address mode, to disable NFC read-out of the security key and to indicate an update of the security key, the manufacturer ID or the source ID.

### 6.7.4 Source Address Write register

The Source Address Write register is 4 byte wide and can be used to modify the lower 32 bit of the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Static Source Address. The upper 16 bit of the SR-SBP2801-BLE-E Static Source Address to identify the device type. In order to do change the lower 32 bit of the Static Source Address, follow these steps:

1. Write new source address into the Source Address Write register
2. Set the UPDATE SOURCE ID flag in the Configuration register to Ob
3. Actuate (press and release) the button of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will determine that it should modify the Static Source Address based on the set- ting of the Update Source ID flag and copy the value of the Source Address Write register

Whexention SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will clear he UPDATE SOURCE ID flag to 0b0

### 6.7.5 Security Key Write register

The Security Key Write register is 16 byte wide and contains the device-unique random security key. The actory programmed key can be replaced with a user defined key by fol- lowing these steps:

1. Write new security key into the Security Key Write register

Note that for security reasons, setting the Security Key to the following values is not possible
x00000000000000000000000000000000
-0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
If the Security Key Write register is set to one of these values then no update of the Security Key will occur
2. Set the UPDATE SECURITY KEY flag in the Configuration register to Ob1
3. If the key should be write-only (not readable after the key update) then set the Private Security Key flag in the Configuration register to 0 b 1
4. Actuate (press and release) the button of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will determine that it should modify the security key based on the setting of the Update Security Key flag and copy the value of the Security Key Write register to the Security Key register in private memory. After successful execution, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will clear the UPDATE SECURITY KEY flag to Ob0 The protected memory is designed to support 1000 modifications of the security key.

Note that it is not possible to read the current security key via NFC if the Security Key Write register has been accidentally overwritten or cleared via NFC write. In this case it is necessary to write a new security key (as described above) or to reset the device to its de-fault security key by means of a factory reset

### 6.7.6 Private Security Key mode

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E provides a private security key mode for applications requiring high security. In this mode, it is possible to write a security key which subsequently is inaccessible via NFC and will not show up in commissioning telegram. In both cases, the security key will be set to all zeros. The written security key thereby is completely inaccessible externally.

To use private security key mode, set the PRIVATE SECURITY KEY flag in the Configuration register is to 0b1, the Security Key Write register to the desired security key and the UP- DATE SECURITY KEY flag in the Configuration register is to 0 b 1 and pushing the button

The Security Key Write register will be cleared to $0 \times 00000000000000000000000000000000$ after successful execution and the written security key will not be NFC readable (even for users having the correct PIN code). If commissioning telegrams are enabled then the secu-rity key will be set to
$0 \times 00000000000000000000000000000000$ there as well.
It is possible to return to Public (NFC-accessible) key mode by clearing the PRIVATE SECURI- TY KEY flag in the Configuration register, setting the Security Key Write register to the desired security key and the UPDATE SECURITYKEY flag in the Configuration register is to
0b1 and pushing the button.
The protected memory is designed to support 1000 modifications of the security key.

### 6.7.7 Product ID and Manufacturer ID Write register

The Product ID register is 8 byte wide and can be used to specify a publicly-accessible parameter (e.g. a userspecific ID or name) that can be read by an NFC commissioning tool in order to determine the specific product type.

The Manufacturer ID is 2 byte wide and specifies the manufacturer of a BLE product and is transmitted as part of each BLE telegram. By default, the manufacturer ID is set to $0 \times 0$ A78 (Sunricher) but it can be changed to a different OEM identifier

Product ID and Manufacturer ID can be changed by following these steps:

1. Write the desired Product ID (8 byte using HEX or ASCII encoding according to user choice) into the Produc ID Write the desired Product ID ( 8 byte using HEX
$0 \times 0000000000000000$ will cause SR-SBP2801-BLE-E not to update the Product ID
2. Write the desired Manufacturer ID (2 byte) into the Manufacturer ID Write register Setting the Manufacturer ID Write register to 0x0000 will cause SR-SBP2801-BLE-E not to update the Manufacturer ID.
3. Set the UPDATE MAN ID flag in the Configuration register to Ob1
4. Actuate (press and release) the button of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will determine that it should update the Product ID and Manufacturer ID based on the setting of the Update Product and Manufacturer ID flag and copy any non-zero value of the Product ID Write register to the Product ID register and any non-zero value of the Manufacturer ID Write Register to the Manufacturer ID register.

After that, SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will clear the UPDATE MAN ID flag to 0b0.

### 6.7.8 Optional Data register

The Optional Data register can be used to specify up to 4 byte of custom data that will be transmitted as part of each data telegram. This optional data can store user-specific or application-specific information.
The size of the Optional Data field is specified by the OPTIONAL DATA SIZE field in the Configuration register The following settings of OPTIONAL DATA SIZE are supported:
.0b00: 0 byte (No optional data, default
2.0b01: 1 byte
4.0b11: 4 byte

If the size of the OPTIONAL DATA SIZE field is set to a non-zero value in the Configuration register then SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will read the corresponding amount of data from the Optional Data register beginning with the least significant byte (Byte 0 - Optional Data 0 ).
Note that using the optional data feature requires additional energy for the radio telegram transmission and might therefore reduce the total number of redundant telegrams which are transmitted.

### 6.7.9 Variant register

The Variant register is 1 byte wide and allows selection of the custom radio transmission modes as described in chapter 3.3. Additionally, it allows reducing the transmission interval from 20 ms to 10 ms and to increase the bit rate from 1 Mbit to 2 Mbit . The structure of the Custom Variant register is shown Figure 31 below.

| VARIANT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bit 7 | Bit 6 | Bit 5 | Bit 4 | Bit 3 | Bit 2 | Bit 1 | Bit 0 |
| RFU |  |  |  | DATA_RATE | INTERVAL | TRANSMISSION_MODE |  |

Figure 31 - Variant register structure
6.7.9.1 Transmission Mode selection

Table 3 below shows the supported custom radio transmission modes that can be selected using Bit [2:0] of the Custom Variant register

| Setting | Meaning |
| :--- | :--- |
| 0 b000 | Commissioning and data telegrams in standard Advertising Mode <br> (Default configuration) |
| 0 b001 | Commissioning telegrams in standard Advertising Mode <br> Data telegrams on 3 user-defined radio channels |
| $0 b 010$ | Commissioning telegrams in standard Advertising Mode <br> Data telegrams on 2 user-defined radio channels |
| $0 b 011$ | Commissioning telegrams in standard Advertising Mode <br> Data telegrams on 1 user-defined radio channel |
| 0 0b100 | Commissioning and Data telegrams on 3 user-defined radio channels |
| $0 b 101$ | Commissioning and Data telegrams on 2 user-defined radio channels |
| 0b110 | Commissioning and Data telegrams on 1 user-defined radio channel |
| 0b111 | RFU (Do not use) |

## Table 3 - Transmission Mode settings

### 6.7.9.2 Interval selection

Starting with version DC-06 it is possible to educe the transmission interval from the default setting of 20 ms to 10 ms by setting bit 3 of the Variant register

| Setting | Result |
| :---: | :---: |
| Ob0 | 20 ms Interval (Default configuration) |
| Ob1 | 10 ms Interval |

Table 4 - Interval settings

### 6.7.9.3 Data rate selection

Starting with version DD-07 it is possible to increase the data rate from the default setting register.

### 6.7.10 Radio channel selection registers

If the TRANSMISSION MODE field of the Variant register is set to a value other than $0 \times 00$ then the radio channels for transmission are selected using the registers TX_CHANNEL1, TX_CHANNEL2 and
TX CHANNEL 3 as described in chapter 3.3
The TX_CHANNEL1, TX_CHANNEL2 and TX_CHANNEL3 registers are 1 byte wide and use the en- coding shown in Table 6 below.

Note that two radio channel types are supported by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E:

1. Standard BLE radio channels

BLE Channel 0 ... BLE Channel 39 use the even frequencies from 2402 MHz to 2480
2. Custom radio channels in between the standard BLE channels

Custom Channel 40 ... 78 use the odd frequencies from 2403 MHz to 2479 MHZ

| TX_CHANNELn | Frequency | Channel Type |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BLE Radio Channels |  |  |
| 37 | 2402 MHZ | BLE Advertising Channel |
| 0 | 2404 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 1 | 2406 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| .- |  |  |
| 10 | 2424 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 38 | 2426 MHZ | BLE Advertising Channel |
| 11 | 2428 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 12 | 2430 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| .. |  |  |
| 36 | 2478 MHZ | BLE Data Channel |
| 39 | 2480 MHZ | BLE Advertising Channel |
| BLE Radio Channels |  |  |
| 40 | 2403 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |
| 41 | 2405 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |
| - |  |  |
| 77 | 2477 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |
| 78 | 2479 MHZ | Custom Radio Channel |

## Table 6 - Radio Channel Selection register settings

### 6.7.11 Customer Data

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E allocates 64 pages (256 byte) for customer data that can be read and written via the NFC interface in protected mode.

The main intention is to enable storing OEM-specific information such as product type, revision, date code or similar. There is however no restriction (other than the maximum size of
256 byte) on the type of content that can be stored in this memory region
SR-SBP2801-BLE-E will not access or modify this memory region.
Users should keep in mind that the content of this memory region will not be affected by a factory reset. This means that after a factory reset, the content of this memory region can be read using the default PIN code. This region should therefore not be used to store sensitive data.

## 6．8 Private data

The private data area stores the following items：
1．Security Key
2．Default settings
The content of the private data area is not externally accessible．

## 6．8．1 Security key

The Security Key field contains the 128 bit private key used for authenticating SR－SBP2801－BLE－E telegrams and for resolving private source addresses

This register is programmed with a random value during manufacturing．It can be changed using the Security Key Write feature described in chapter 6．7．5

## 6．8．2 Default settings

The Default Settings field contains a backup of the following SR－SBP2801－BLE－E factory settings：
1．Static Source Address
2．Security Key
3．Manufacturer ID
4．NFC PIN Code
These default settings can be restored by means of a factory reset as described in chapter 5．4．

## 7．SR－SBP2801－BLE－E device label

Each SR－SBP2801－BLE－E module contains a device label．
Note that the finished switches use a different product label as described in their user manuals and the information given in the subsequent chapters applies only to the SR－SBP2801－BLE－E module itself．

## 7．1 SR－SBP2801－BLE－E device label structure

Figure 32 Figure 32 below shows the structure of the SR－SBP2801－BLE－E device label．It identifies key parameters such as the source address（in this case E280101500100）and the manufacturing date（in this case week 30,2018 ）in writing．Additionally，it contains a QR code for camera－based commissioning as discussed in chapter 5．2．

Figure 32 －SR－SBP2801－BLE－E device label structure

## 田虽 <br> 回话：ID：0296DE99

Model：SR－SBP2801－BLE－E FCC ID：2AHST－SRZGP2801K4 IC：20309－SRZGP2801K4

### 7.2 QR code format

The QR code used in the SR－SBP2801－BLE－E product label encodes key product parameter according to the ANSI／MH10．8．2－2013 industry standard．The QR code shown in Figure 32 above encodes the following string：

30SE280101500100＋Z0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF＋30PS2801－B215＋2PAA01＋S01234567890123
Table 7 Table 7 below describes the ANSI／MH10．8．2 data identifiers used by the SR－SBP2801－BLE－E device label and shows the interpretation of the data therein．

| Identifier | Length | Content | Value in this example |
| :---: | :---: | :--- | :--- |
| $30 S$ | 12 char | Static Source Address | E215558FE89C |
| $Z$ | 32 char | Security Key | $6675 D 7 D 8 F 08 E 405 D 8695 F 7 F 8 D 06 E F 76 A$ |
| 30 P | 10 char | Ordering Code | S2801－B215 |
| $2 P$ | 4 char | Step Code－Revision | AA01 |
| S | 14 char | Serial Number | 01234567890123 |

Table 7 －QR code format

## 8．Device integration

SR－SBP2801－BLE－E is designed for integration into button or rocker－based switches．It can therefore be used with a wide variety of existing designs．

8．1 Mechanical interface drawings



## 8．2 OEM product QR cod

Customers integrating SR－SBP2801－BLE－E modules into their own OEM products should include a QR code on their product label for the purpose of commissioning as described in chapter 5．2．This QR code can then be scanned by commissioning tools to automatically extract the required product parameters．

The QR code has to use to the ANSI／MH10．8．2－2013 industry standard with the syntax described in chapter 7．2．The OEM product QR code should at a minimum contain the three fields listed in Table 8 below．

| Identifier | Length of data（excluding identifier） | Value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 30 S | 12 characters | Static Source Address（hex） |
| $Z$ | 32 characters | Security Key（hex） |
| $30 P$ | 10 characters | Device Type：S2801－B215 |

Table 8 －Required fields for the product QR code

### 8.2.1 Example for an OEM product QR code

位 parameters:
1.Static Source Address: E215558FE89C
2.Security Key: 6675D7D8F08E405D8695F7F8D06EF76A
3.Device Type:

30PS2801-O215
The resulting ANSI/MH10.8.2-2013 string would be
30SE215558FE89C+Z6675D7D8F08E405D8695F7F8D06EF76A+30PS2801-O215+2PAA01+S10000000000005
Figure 39 below shows the QR code corresponding to this example. This QR code should be part of the OEM product label with a size and resolution that enables easy scanning using a mobile phone or tablet.


## 9. Application information

### 9.1 Transmission range

The main factors that influence the system transmission range are
Type and location of the antennas of receiver and transmitter
Type of terrain and degree of obstruction of the link path
Sources of interference affecting the receiver
"Dead spots" caused by signal reflections from nearby conductive objects
Since the expected transmission range strongly depends on this system conditions, range tests should always be performed to determine the reliably achievable range under the given conditions.

The following figures should be treated as a rough guide only:
Line-of-sight connections
Typically 10 m range in corridors, up to 30 m in halls
-Plasterboard walls / dry wood
ypically 10 m range, through max. 2 walls
-Ferro concrete walls / ceilings
Typically 5 m range, through max. 1 ceiling (depending on thickness)
Fire-safety walls, elevator shafts, staircases and similar areas should be considered as shielded
The angle at which the transmitted signal hits the wall is very important. The effective wall thickness - and with the signal attenuation - varies according to this angle. Signals should be transmitted as directly as possible hrough the wall. Wall niches should be avoid- ed
ther factors restricting transmission range include
Switch mounting on metal surfaces (up to $30 \%$ loss of transmission range
Hollow lightweight walls filled with insulating wool on metal foil
alse ceilings with panels of metal or carbon fibre
-Lead glass or glass with metal coating steel furniture
distance between the receiver and other transmitting dices computers, audio and video equipment that also emit high-frequency signals should be at least 0.5 m .

Note that interference from other radio equipment operating in the 2.4 GHz band (WiFi routers, smartphones,

## wireless audio and video systems, etc.) can have major impact on radio performance.

### 9.2 Receiver configuration

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E communicates user actions (rocker push / release) using a sequence of advertising telegrams as described in chapter 3.

In order to maximize the likelihood of reception of these telegrams, it is necessary that the receiver is either permanently in receive mode on one of the radio channels used by SBP
2801 or - if this is not possible - periodically in receive mode for a sufficiently long duration
Three key timing parameters have to be considered when configuring a receiver (scanner) for periodical reception of advertising events sent by a transmitter (advertiser). These three parameters are:
1.Advertising interva
rime between two advertising events sent by the transmitter
2. Scan interval

Time between the start of two consecutive scanning cycles of the receiver
3.Scan window

Duration for which the receiver will scan within each scanning cycle
Figure 40 below illustrates these three parameters.


Time


Time
Figure 40 - Scanning parameters
9.2.1 Advertising interval

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E transmits advertising events with an advertising interval of either 20 ms (default setting) or 10 ms (NFC configurable setting)

The time required to transmit each advertising telegram within the advertising event is ap- proximately 0.5 ms and the time required to transmit the entire advertising event (transmission of three advertising telegrams on three different radio channels including radio channel change) is approximately 2.5 ms

### 9.2.2 Scan window

dvertising telegram
To ensure this requirement, we consider the worst-case condition where the receiver starts scanning directly after the start of one transmission and therefore misses a part of it. Under these conditions, it is necessary tha he receiver remains active until the next advertising telegram has been fully transmitted. This is illustrated in Figure 41 below

Figure 41 - Scan window setting


From Figure 41 above it can be seen that the minimum duration of the scan window is dependent on the advertising interval:
1.If SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses 20 ms advertising intervals, then the scan window has to be at least 20 ms (advertising interval) plus 0.5 ms (telegram duration) plus a timing margin to account for the random time offse ad the transmitter
Using a scan window of at least 23 ms is recommended for this case.
2.If SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses 10 ms advertising intervals, then the scan window has to be at least 10 ms (advertising interval) plus 0.5 ms (telegram duration) plus a timing margin to account for the random time offse at the transmitter.
Using a scan window of at least 13 ms is recommended for this case.

### 2.3 Scan interval

he scan interval has to be selected such that the receiver will not be inactive so long that it misses all three advertising events
he longest period for which the receiver can be inactive is given by the time between the end of the first
 advertising event (so that this will certainly be received). Figure 42 illustrates this. -
igure 42 - Scan interval setting

rom Figure 42 above it can be seen that the maximum duration of the scan interval is de-pendent on the advertising interval:
1.If SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses 20 ms advertising intervals, then the scan interval has to be less than the time between the end of the first advertising event and the begin of the third advertising event ( 2 * $20 \mathrm{~ms}=40 \mathrm{~ms}$ ) minus 0.5 ms (telegram duration) minus a timing margin to account for the random time offset at the ansmitter.
Using a scan interval of no more than 37 ms is recommended for this case.
2.If SR-SBP2801-BLE-E uses 10 ms advertising intervals, then the scan interval has to be less than the time between the end of the first advertising event and the begin of the third advertising event ( $2 * 10 \mathrm{~ms}=20 \mathrm{~ms}$ ) minus 0.5 ms (telegram duration) minus a timing margin to account for the random time offset at the transmitter.

## Using a scan interval of no more than 17 ms is recommended for this case.

### 9.2.4 Summary

Table 9 below summarizes the recommended receiver scan settings

| SR-SBP2801-BLE-E <br> Advertising Interval | Receiver Scan Window <br> (Minimum) | Receiver Scan Interval <br> (Maximum) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10 ms | 23 ms | 37 ms |
| 20 ms | 13 ms | 17 ms |

## Table 9 - Recommended receiver scan setting

## 10.Regulatory information

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E has been certified according to FCC (US), ISED (CA) and RED (EU) regulations. Change or modifications not expressly approved by Sunricher could void the user's authority to operate the equipment.

### 10.1 RED for European Marke

The Radio Equipment Directive (2014/53/EU, typically referred to as RED) replaces R\&TTE directive as regulatory framework for radio products in the European Union. All products sold final customers within the European Union have to be compliant to RED. At the time of writing, the text of the RED legislation was available from this link: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/53/oj

Dolphin radio modules are components which are delivered to OEM manufacturers for their use/integration in final or combined products. It is the responsibility of the OEM manufacturer to demonstrate compliance to all applicable EU directives and standards. The Sunricher attestation of conformity can be used as input to the declaration of conformity for the full product.

At the time of writing, guidance on the implementation of EU product rules - the so called "Blue Guide" - was available from this link: http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/18027/
Specifically within the new RED framework, all OEM manufacturers have for instance to fulfill the following additional requirements:
-Provide product branding (on the product) clearly identifying company name o
brand and product name as well as type, charge or serial number for market surveillance
frequency band and max. transmitting powe
Include (with the product) user manual, safety information and a declaration of conformity for the final produc in local language
-Provide product development and test documentation upon request
Please contact an accredited test house for detailed guidance.

## TCB

GRANT OF EQUIPMENT
AUTHORIZATION
Certification
Issued Under the Authority of the
Federal Communications Commission

Certification
Federal Communications Commission
By:
Compliance Testing, LLC
1724 S. Nevada W
Mesa, AZ 85204
Date of Grant: 09/24/2020
Application Dated: 09/23/2020
Shenzhen Sunricher Technology Limited
3rd Floor,B building,Jia'an Industrial Building,
Liu Xian Third road,No. 72 area
Xin'an Street, Baoan District, Shenzhen,

## Attention: Sunny Zou , Manager


10.2.1 FCC (United States) Regulatory Statement

This device complies with part 15 of the FCC Rules. Operation is subject to the following two conditions:
(1) this device may not cause harmful interference, and
(2) this device must accept any interference received, including interference that may cause undesired peration.

10.3 IC (Industry Canada) Certificate

### 0.3.1 IC (Industry Canada) Regulatory Statement

解 following two conditions.

1) this device may not cause interference, and
2) this device must accept any interference, including interference that may cause unde- sired operation of the device.

Le présent appareil est conforme aux CNR d'Industrie Canada applicables aux appareils radio exempts de icence
exploitation est autorisée aux deux conditions suivantes
(1) l'appareil ne doit pas produire de brouillage, e
(2) I'utilisateur de l'appareil doit accepter tout brouillage radioélectrique subi, même si le brouillage es susceptible d'en compromettre le fonctionnement."

## A. Parsing SR-SBP2801-BLE-E radio telegrams

This appendix is intended as an example of how start to parse received SR-SBP2801-BLE-E radio telegrams. Please refer to chapter 4 first for a description of the BLE frame structure

## A. 1 Data telegram example

We consider the following raw data telegram data captured from an Sunricher SR-SBP2801-BLE-E device: D6 BE 898 E 4213 9F 1 B 000015 E2 0C FF DA 036901000010 8AD6C1 7E 16 EE 23

## A.1.1 BLE frame structure

The message shown above can be parsed into the following components (keep in mind the little endian byte rder)

BLE Access Address (4 byte): 0x8E89BED6
BLE Frame Control (2 byte): 0x1342
size of source address + payload: 0x13 (19 byte)
Telegram type: Non-connectable Advertising
BLE Source Address (6 byte): 0xE21500001B9F
Length of payload (1 byte): 0x0C (12 byte)
Type of payload (1 byte): 0xFF (manufacturer-specific data)
anufacturer ID (2 byte): 0x0A78 (Sunricher) Sunricher Payload (9 byte):69 01000010 8A D6 C1 7E CRC (3 byte): 16 EE 23

## A.1.2 Sunricher data telegram payload structure

The Sunricher data telegram payload can now be parsed as follows: Sequence Counter (4 byte):0x00000169 witch Status: 10 (Release of button B1)

Telegram Signature:C7 24 EA F0

## A. 2 Commissioning telegram example

e consider the following raw commissioning telegram data captured from an Sunriche
SR-SBP2801-BLE-E device
D6 BE 89 8E 4224 9F 1 B 000015 E2 1E FF DA 0371010000 AB 4B 9A 9185 2B 70 B8 A6 52 A0 5E 92 BB 12 A0 9F 1B 000015 E2 9E 6D 7C

## A. 1 BLE frame structure

The message shown above can be parsed into the following components (keep in mind the little endian byte order):

BLE Access Address (4 byte): 0x8E89BED6

BLE Frame Control (2 byte): 0x2442
Size of source address + payload: 0x24 (36 byte)
Telegram type: Non-connectable Advertising
BLE Source Address ( 6 byte): 0xE21500001B9F
Length of payload ( 1 byte): $0 \times 1 \mathrm{E}$ ( 30 byte
Note that this field should correctly be set to $0 \times 1 \mathrm{D}$
This issue has been corrected in product version DC-06
Type of payload ( 1 byte): 0xFF (manufacturer-specific data)
Manufacturer ID (2 byte): 0x0A78 (Sunricher)
Sunricher Payload (27 byte): 71010000 AB 4B 9A 9185 2B 70 B8 A6 52 A0 5E 92 BB 12 A0 9F 1B 000015 E2 CRC (3 byte): 0x7C6D9E

## A.2.2 Sunricher commissioning telegram payload structure

The Sunricher commissioning telegram payload can now be parsed as follows Sequence Counter (4 byte): 0x00000171

Security Key: AB 4B 9A 9185 2B 70 B8 A6 52 A0 5E 92 BB 12 A0
Static Source Address: 0xE21500001B9F

## B. Address resolution for resolvable private addresses (RPA)

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E provides the option to obfuscate its identity by means of using resolvable private addresses (RPA) as described in chapter 4.4.2. The following chapters describe how to re-solve such addresses.

## B.1.1 RPA resolution flow

The execution flow for resolving private addresses (RPA) is shown in Figure 43 below

| $0000000 \ldots . .0000000$ | prand |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 104 Bit Padding (all zero) | 24 Bit prand |
| Identity Resolution Key (IRK) |  |
| 128 Bit Identity Resolution Key (IRK). |  |

Figure 43 - Execution flow for resolving private addresses (RPA resolution)
Input to the RPA resolution flow is the prand part of the resolvable private address field of the received telegram together with one (or several) locally stored IRK

The receiver will then try for each locally stored IRK if the hash generated using the execution flow above matches the hash part of the resolvable private address field of the received telegram. If it does, then the IRK identifies the device from which this telegram originated

## B.1.2 Address resolution example

We consider a SR-SBP2801-BLE-E device with the following IRK (options for determining the IRK / security key of a SR-SBP2801-BLE-E are described in chapter C.1.3.)

## BE759A027A4870FD242794F4C45220FB

We further consider a telegram having the following resolvable private address
493970E51944
We will now test if this resolvable private address was generated using the IRK above. Referring to the resolvable private address structure shown in Figure 12, we split the re-solvable private address into prand and hash as follows:
prand $=($ RPA \& \& 0xFFFFFF000000 $) \gg 24$ prand $=0 \times 493970$
ash $=$ RPA \& \& 0x000000FFFFFF
hash $=0 \times E 51944$
ext, we verify the address mode by looking at the two most significant bit of prand
mode $=($ prand $\& \& 0 x C 00000) \gg 22$ mode $=0 b 01$
Referring to chapter 4.4.2, the setting of 0b01 indicates resolvable private address mode. To generate the hash, we add 104 bit of padding (all zeros) to prand:
x000000000000000000000000000493970
We can now generate the hash as AES128 operation between the IRK and the thus padded prand:
hash = AES128(IRK; Padded prand
hash $=$ AES128(0xBE759A027A4870FD242794F4C45220FB
$0 \times 00000000000000000000000000493970$
At the time of writing, a suitable online AES calculator could be found here
http://testprotect.com/appendix/AEScalc
With this, we can calculate the result as:
hash $=0 \times 286$ ACB1F9C8A80EE21B3F02225E51944
With that, we can verify that the lowest 24 bit of the calculated hash (0xE51944) match the hash that was received as part of the resolvable private address. Therefore, the transmitter of this telegram used this specific IRK to generate this resolvable private address.

## . Authentication of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E data telegrams

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E provides the option to authenticate its data telegrams as described in chapter 4.6.3. The authentication mechanism used by SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is standardized as RFC3610. The full RFC3610 specification could be found here at the time of writing and should be used as primary source of information https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3610.txt

The following description aims to summarize the security processing steps for users not deeply familiar with cryptography in general or RFC3610 in particular

## C. 1 Algorithm input parameters

The purpose of the security processing in SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is to calculate a unique signature that can be used to verify authenticity (telegram has not been modified) and originality (telegram comes from the assumed sender) of a telegram

To do so, two types of algorithm parameters are required

1. Constant algorithm input parameters

These parameters identify high level algorithm and telegram properties and are the same for any SR-SBP2801 BLE-E telegram
. Variable algorithm input parameters
these parameters identify telegram-specific parameters and therefore depend on the specifics of the ransmitted telegram

## C.1.1 Constant input parameters

The RFC3610 implementation in SR-SBP2801-BLE-E requires two constant input parameters:

1. Length field size

This is the size (in byte) of the field used to encode the length of the input data
(which is the payload to be authenticated).
The maximum size of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E payload to be authenticated is 13 byte; therefore one byte would be easily sufficient to encode the payload size. The minimum value
permitted by the standard is however 2 bytes which is therefore chosen.
2. Signature size

This is the desired size of the generated signature which is 4 byte for SR-SBP2801-BLE-E
Table 11 below summarizes these constant algorithm parameters.

| Parameter | Comment / Description | Example |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Length Field Size | Size (in bytes) of the field used to <br> encode the input length | 2 (always, minimum permissible size) |
| Signature Size | Desired size (in byte) of the signa- <br> ture generated by the algorithm | 4 (always) |

## Table 11 - Constant algorithm input parameters

## C.1.2 Variable input parameters

 1. Source addressThe 6 byte source address used to identify the sender of an authenticated message. The source address is required in little endian (least significant byte first) format.
2. Input data (Payload to be authenticated)

The authenticated payload contains source address, sequence counter, switch status and optional data (if present). See chapter 4.6.3 for a description of the authenticated payload.
3. Input length (Size of the payload to be authenticated)

The length of the payload to be authenticated depends on the amount of optional data used in the telegram This is configured via the Configuration register, see chapter 6.7.3
By default, no optional data is present and the length of the authenticated payload is 9 byte.
4. Sequence counter

Each SR-SBP2801-BLE-E contains a sequence counter which is initialized to zero during production and increased for each telegram that is sent.
The sequence counter is transmitted as part of the input data.
The receiver of SR-SBP2801-BLE-E telegrams keeps track of this counter and will accept only telegrams with counter values higher than the highest previously used value. This eliminates the possibility of reusing
Note that the individual (identical)
(he advertising telegrams used to encode the same data telegram use the same sequence counter value.
5. Security key

Each SR-SBP2801-BLE-E is programmed with a random 16 byte security key during manufac- turing. This key can be modified using the NFC interface, see chapter 6.7.5.
Table 12 below summarizes these parameters.

| Parameter | Comment / Description | Example |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Source Address | Unique source address of the SR- <br> SBP2801-BLE-E module (little endian) | B819000015E2 (little endian <br> representation of E2801000019B8) |
| Input Data | Telegram data to be authenticated | 0CFFDA035D04000011 |
| Input Length | Length of input data (in bytes, en- <br> coded using 2 bytes) | 0x0009 (if optional data size $=0$, default) <br> 0x000A (if optional data size $=1$ ) <br> 0x000B (if optional data size $=2)$ <br> 0x000D (if optional data size $=4$ ) |
| Sequence Counter | Incrementing counter to avoid replay <br> Part of the input data (byte 4 $\ldots 7$ ) | 5D040000 (little endian representation <br> of the counter value 0000045D) |
| Security Key | 128 bit random key that is known both <br> to sender and receiver | 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE <br> 2ABB |

## Table 12 - Variable input parameters

## C.1.3 Obtaining the security key

All required parameters except the security key can be directly extracted from the received message that shall be authenticated.

The security key -the common secret shared between sender and receiver - has to be obtained via specific mechanisms. As described in chapter 5 , there are three different ways to obtain the security key of a given SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module:

1. Obtaining the key via the NFC configuration interface
2. Obtaining the key via the product DMC code
3. Obtaining the key via a dedicated commissioning telegram

Each option is described now in detail.

## C.1.3.1 Obtaining the security key via NFC interface

Using the Elatec TWN4 reader (as described in chapter 6.3), the security key can be read using the following command sequence
SearchTag(32)
NTAG_PwdAuth ( $0 \times 000 \times 000 \times E 20 \times 15,0 \times 000 \times 00$ )
NTAG_Read(0x14)
This is equivalent to the following binary command sequence:
Request: 050020
Request: 20060000E28010000
Response:0001
Request: 200014
Response:00013DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB
The tag response to the last command - NTAG_Read(0x14) - contains the password: NTAG_Read(0x14)Result: truePage: 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB
The password of this device is therefore: 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB

## C.1.3.2 Obtaining the security key via the product QR code

ach SR-SBP2801-BLE-E module contains a QR code on its product label which identifies source ad-dress and security key of the module as described in chapter 8.3
he QR code of the device used for this tutorial is shown in Figure 44 below shows the same information encoded according to that

Figure 44 - Example QR code


The QR code shown above encodes the following text
30SE215558FE89C+Z6675D7D8F08E405D8695F7F8D06EF76A+30PS2801-
B215+2PDD07+S10000000000005
The security key can then be obtained from the " $Z$ " field as highlighted in red above

## C.1.3.3 Obtaining the security key via a commissioning telegram

SR-SBP2801-BLE-E modules can send dedicated commissioning telegrams that identify their security key. SR-SBP2801-BLE-E modules can send dedicated commissioning telegrams that identify their security key.
Transmission of such commissioning telegrams can be triggered by means of a specific button sequence as
described in chapter 5.3 .

Note that this feature can be disabled via the NFC commissioning interface by setting the DISABLE LRN TELEGRAM flag in the Configuration register to Ob1 (see chapter 6.7.3).

The resulting commissioning telegram has the following payload:
1D FF DA 03560400006675 D7 D8 F0 8E 40 5D 8695 F7 F8 D0 6E F7 6A B8 19000015 E2
Please see Figure 16 in chapter 5.3.2 for a description of the commission telegram structure.

The location of the security key is for reference highlighted red above. This means that the security key of this device is:

3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB

## C.1.4 Internal parameters

The RFC3610 implementation in SR-SBP2801-BLE-E derives a set of internal parameters for furthe processing from the provided input parameters.

Again, there are two types of internal parameters:

1. Constant internal parameters

These parameters are based on the high level algorithm and telegram properties and are the same for any SR-SBP2801-BLE-E telegram
2. Variable input parameters

These parameters are based on the telegram-specific parameters and therefore depend on the specifics of the transmitted telegram

## C.1.5 Constant internal parameters

The RFC3610 implementation in SR-SBP2801-BLE-E derives two internal parameters - M' and L' - based on the input data and uses them to construct A0_Flag and B_0_Flag which - together with the iteration counter iare required for subsequent processing.

The value of these internal parameters - listed in Table 13 below - is the same for all SBP2801 telegrams.

| Parameter | Comment / Description | Example |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| M' $^{\prime}$ | Binary encoded output length <br> $\mathrm{M}^{\prime}=($ Output length $/ 2)-1$ | 0b001 (always) |
| L' | Binary encoded length field size <br> $\mathrm{L}^{\prime}=$ length field size -1 | 0b001 (always) |
| A0_Flag | $\mathrm{L}^{\prime}$ | $0 \times 01$ (always) |
| B0_Flag | (0b01<<6) + (M'<<3)+ L' | $0 \times 49$ (always) |
| i | Iteration counter | $0 \times 0000$ (always) |

Table 13 - Constant internal parameters

## C.1.6 Variable internal parameters

The RFC3610 implementation in SR-SBP2801-BLE-E derives four internal parameters - Nonce, A0, B0 and B - based on the telegram specific input data and the constant internal parameters.

These variable internal parameters - listed in Table 14 below - are then used together with the security key to calculate the actual signature.

| Parameter | Comment / Description | Example |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| Nonce | 13 byte initialization vector based <br> on concatenation of source <br> address, sequence counter and <br> padding, see 4.7.1 | FE190000015E2D00A0000000000 |
| A0 | A0_Flag followed by Nonce <br> followed by 2 byte 0x00 | 01FE19000015E2D00A00000000000000 |
| B0 | B0_Flag followed by Nonce <br> followed by 2 byte 0x00 (no <br> message to encode) | 49FE19000015E2D00A00000000000000 |
| B1 | Input Length followed by Input <br> Data followed by 5/4 / 3/1 byte of <br> 0x00 padding (for optional data <br> size $=0 / 1 / 2 / 4$ byte) | 00090CFFDA03D00A00000030000000000 |

Table 14 - Variable internal parameters

## C. 2 Algorithm execution sequence

he algorithm uses the variable internal parameters $A \_0, B \_0, B \_1$ together with the private key to generate the authentication vector T_0 using three AES-128 and two XOR operations. The algorithm execution sequence is shown in Figure 45 below. The first four bytes of T_0 are then used to authenticate SR-SBP2801-BLE-E telegrams.


Figure 45 - Authentication algorithm sequence

## C. 3 Examples

The following four chapters give step by step examples based on one actual device and $0 / 1 / 2$ or 4 byte of optional data.

## C.3.1 Data telegram without optional data

For this example, we consider the following telegram payload received from a SR-SBP2801-BLE-E with the source address E2801000019B8 and security key 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB: CC FF DA 03 5D 04000011 B2 FA 88 FF
The last four bytes of this payload (B2 FA 88 FF) are the sender-provided signature which has to be authenticated (compared against the signature the receiver calculates based on its own security key). The variable input parameters are therefore the following:

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Source Address | B819000015E2 (little endian representation of E2801000019B8) |
| Input Data | 0CFFDA035D04000011 |
| Input Length | $0 \times 0009$ |
| Sequence Counter | 5D040000 |
| Security Key | 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB |

The constant internal parameters are always the same:

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| A0_Flag | $0 \times 01$ (always) |
| B0_Flag | $0 \times 49$ (always) |
| i | $0 \times 0000$ (always) |

Based on variable input data and constant internal algorithm parameters, we can now derive the following variable internal parameters

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Nonce | B819000015E25D040000000000 |
| A0 | 01B819000015E25D04000000000000000 |
| B0 | 49B819000015E25D04000000000000000 |
| B1 | 00090CFFDA035D040000110000000000 |

We can now calculate the signature using AES128 and XOR operations.
calculator could be found here: http://testprotect.com/appendix/AEScalc

Likewise, a suitable XOR calculator could be found here
http://xor.pw/?
The execution sequence would then be as follows:
X_1 = AES128(B0, Key)
$\mathrm{X}-1=A E S 128(B 0$, Key
X 1 = AES128(49B819000015E25D0400000000000000, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB) X $1=$ 411ef09792ae152ae52c671435c1f247d
$X \_1 A=X O R\left(X 1, B \_1\right)$
$\mathrm{X}_{-}^{-1} 1 \mathrm{~A}=\mathrm{XOR}(41$ ef09792ae152ae52c671435c1f247d, 00090CFFDA035D040000110000000000) X - $1 \mathrm{~A}=$ 41-1e60586f0e20faa52c660435c1f247d
X_2 $=$ AES128(X1A, Key)
X_2 $=$ AES128(41e60586f0e20faa52c660435c1f247d, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB) $\mathrm{X}^{-} 2=8 \mathrm{~d} 89 \mathrm{e} 733 \mathrm{da} 516 \mathrm{ae} 3 \mathrm{e} 08 \mathrm{f} 9 \mathrm{e} 30184909 \mathrm{fc}$

S_0 = AES128(A0, Key) $00015 E 25 D 0400000000000000,3 D D A 31 A D 44767 A E 3 C E 56 D C E 2 B 3 C E 2 A B B)$
S_0 = 3f736fcc8bcaf2d4aabca0260fab7976
T_0 = XOR (X_2, S_0
$\mathrm{T}_{-}^{-} 0=$ XOR( $8 \mathrm{~d} 89 \mathrm{e} \overline{7} 33 \mathrm{da} 516 \mathrm{ae} 3 \mathrm{e} 08 \mathrm{ff9} \mathrm{e} 30184909 \mathrm{fc}$, 3f736fcc8bcaf2d4aabca0260fab7976) $\mathrm{T}_{-} 0=$ b2 2 fa88ff519b98374a333e1617e2708a
The calculated signature is formed by the first four bytes of T_0, i.e. it is B2 FA 88 FF.
The calculated signature matches the signature that was transmitted as part of the payload. This proves that the telegram originates from a sender that possesses the same security key and the telegram content has not been modified.

## C.3.2 Data telegram with 1 byte optional data

For this example, we consider the following telegram payload received from a SR-SBP2801-BLE-E with the source address E2801000019B8 and security key 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB:
OD FF DA 03620400001012 B9 FE AC C1
The last four bytes of this payload (B9 FE AC C1) are the sender-provided signature which has to be authenticated. The variable input parameters are therefore the following

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Source Address | B819000015E2 (little endian representation of E2801000019B8) |
| Input Data | 0DFFDA03620400001012 |
| Input Length | 0x000A |
| Sequence Counter | 62040000 |
| Security Key | 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB |

Based on variable input data and constant internal algorithm parameters, we can now de-rive the following variable internal parameters:

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Nonce | B8190000015E262040000000000 |
| A0 | 01B819000015E26204000000000000000 |
| B0 | 49B819000015E26204000000000000000 |
| B1 | 000A0DFFDA0362040000101200000000 |

The execution sequence would then be as follows:
X_1 = AES128(B0, Key)

X 1 = AES128(49B819000015E2620400000000000000, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB) X 1 c8d685f968e795b23f4370b3091f33f

X_1A = XOR(X_1, B_1)
X_1A = XOR(dc8d685f968e795b23f4370b3091f33f, 000A0DFFDA0362040000101200000000) X_1A = dc8765a04c8d1b5f23f427193091f33f
X_2 = AES128(X1A, Key)

- 2 =AES128(dc8765a04c8d1b5f23f427193091f33f, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB) - $2=231$ be2ff54ca62fb38d32
- $=$ AES128(A0, Key) $00015 E 2620400000000000000$, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB) S $0=$ aae54e3e95de9f91a0c279537bc25b00
$\mathrm{T}_{-}^{-0}=$ XOR(231be2ff54ca62fb38d32eaaaf1b447d, 9ae54e3e95de9f91a0c279537bc25b00) T_0 = b9̄feacc1c114fd6a981157f9d4d91f7d
The calculated signature is formed by the first four bytes of T_0, i.e. it is B9 FE AC C1


## C.3.3 Data telegram with 2 byte optional data

For this example, we consider the following telegram payload received from a SR-SBP2801-BLE-E with the source address E2801000019B8 and security key 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB

OE FF DA 036304000011123452 E0 5116
The last four bytes of this payload ( 52 E0 51 16) are the sender-provided signature which has to be authenticated. The variable input parameters are therefore the following

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Source Address | B819000015E2 (little endian representation of E2801000019B8) |
| Input Data | 0EFFDA0363040000111234 |
| Input Length | $0 \times 000$ B |
| Sequence Counter | 62040000 |
| Security Key | 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB |

Based on variable input data and constant internal algorithm parameters, we can now de- rive the following ariable internal parameters:

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Nonce | B819000015E263040000000000 |
| A0 | 01B819000015E26304000000000000000 |
| B0 | 49B819000015E26304000000000000000 |
| B1 | 000B0EFFDA0363040000111234000000 |

## The execution sequence would then be as follows:

- 1 = AES128(B0, Key)
(3) __1 = ab5ec24beabc9ddeeb73751c7734cc64
$X-1 A=X O R(X-1, B-1)$
X_1A = XOR(ab5ec24beabc9ddeeb73751c7734cc64,000B0EFFDA0363040000111234000000) X_1A= ab55ccb430bffedaeb73640e4334cc64

X 2 = AES128(X1A, Key)
$X \quad 2=$ AES128(X1A, Key)
X $2=$ AES128(ab55ccb430bffedaeb73640e4334cc64, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB)
$\mathrm{X}^{-} 2=\mathrm{d} 33 \mathrm{e} 96 \mathrm{~d} 7 \mathrm{a} 105 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{e} 8543207 \mathrm{f} 9 \mathrm{e} 75 \mathrm{e} 6 \mathrm{cfe}$
S_0 = AES128(A0, Key)
_0 = AES128(01B819000015E26304000000000000000, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB) S_0 = 81dec7c16915c6647d92b0668f65e9c9

T_0 = XOR (X_2, S_0)
$\mathrm{T}^{-} 0=\mathrm{XOR}(\mathrm{d} \overline{3} 3 \mathrm{e} 9 \overline{\mathrm{E}} \mathrm{d} 7 \mathrm{a} 105 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{e} 8543207 \mathrm{f} 9 \mathrm{e} 75 \mathrm{e} 6 \mathrm{cfe}, 81 \mathrm{dec} 7 \mathrm{c} 16915 \mathrm{c} 6647 \mathrm{~d} 92 \mathrm{~b} 0668 \mathrm{f65e9c} 9) \mathrm{T} 0=$ 52-05116c810028c29a0b79f683b8537

The calculated signature is formed by the first four bytes of T_0, i.e. it is 52 E5 1116.
C.3.4 Data telegram with 4 byte optional data

For this example, we consider the following telegram payload received from a SR-SBP2801-BLE-E with the source address E2801000019B8 and security key 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB: 10 FF DA 03 6A 0400001012345678 2C 9E 1095

The last four bytes of this payload (2C 9E 10 95) are the sender-provided signature which has to be authenticated. The variable input parameters are therefore the following

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Source Address | B819000015E2 (little endian representation of E2801000019B8) |
| Input Data | 10FFDA036A0400001012345678 |
| Input Length | 0x000D |
| Sequence Counter | 6A040000 |
| Security Key | 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB |

Based on variable input data and constant internal algorithm parameters, we can now de-rive the following variable internal parameters

| Parameter | In this example |
| :---: | :--- |
| Nonce | B819000015E26A040000000000 |
| A0 | 01B819000015E26A04000000000000000 |
| B0 | 49B819000015E26A04000000000000000 |
| B1 | 000D10FFDA036A040000101234567800 |

The execution sequence would then be as follows:
X_1 = AES128(B0, Key)
$\mathrm{X}^{-} 1=$ AES128(49B819000015E26A04000000000000000, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB) X 1 434fa5855b8a8a8ae99bf1cb114a51b7

X_1A=XOR (X_1, B 1)
$\mathrm{X}^{-} 1 \mathrm{~A}=\mathrm{XOR}(4 \overline{3} 4 \mathrm{fa} 5 \overline{8} 55 \mathrm{~b} 8 \mathrm{a} 8 \mathrm{a} 8 \mathrm{ae} 99 \mathrm{bf} 1 \mathrm{cb} 114 \mathrm{a} 51 \mathrm{~b} 7,000 \mathrm{D} 10 \mathrm{FFDA} 036 \mathrm{~A} 040000101234567800)$
$X_{-}^{-1 A}=4342 b 57 a 8189 e 08 e e 99 b e 1 d 9251 c 29 b 7$
X_2 = AES128(X1A, Key)
X_2 = AES128(4344b57a8189e08ee99be1d9251c29b7, 3DDA31AD44767AE3CE56DCE2B3CE2ABB
$X_{-}^{-} 2=12 c 78 b 85 a 4 e c b 6 f 34 d a f f 7651 d b 8 e 386$
S_0 = AES128(A0, Key)
 3-599b103f33447e6b46eec4a042d0bc

T_0 $=$ XOR (X_2, S_0)
$\mathrm{T}^{-} 0=$ XOR(12c78b85a4ecb6f34daff7651db8e386, 3e599b103f33447e6b46eec4a042d0bc)T $0=$ 2c9e10959bdff28d26e919a1bdfa333a

The calculated signature is formed by the first four bytes of T_0, i.e. it is 2C 9E 1095.

